The Myth Of Popular Participation


the Myth Of Popular Participation

by the majority against the Loyalists, in which coercive persuasion was the preferred alternative, and in which there was no falling out (but there were disagreements to be sure) within the revolutionary coalition. France had not yet allied with the Americans. During Washingtons presidency, the American pamphleteer Thomas Paine, then living in France, revealed much of what had occurred. Couldnt two million free colonists muster a force of 100,000 or so citizen-soldiers, nearly four times the size of Britains army in 1775? Royal authority had been restored in Georgia, and much of South Carolina was occupied by the British. Nelson, The American Tory (London: 1961 and Wallace Brown, The Good Americans: The loyalists in the American Revolution (N.Y.: 1969. He took Philadelphia, but he accomplished little by his action. Early in the war, Washington wrote that he despaired of compleating the army by Voluntary Inlistments. We had very good provisions all winter, he would write, adding that he had lived in a snug room. Among the critics was Massachusetts John Adams, then a delegate to the Second Continental Congress.

The Myth Of Popular Participation
the Myth Of Popular Participation

The unstated assumption of all those who mistakenly cited Adams is the notion that one of the participants could provide an adequate breakdown of the size of the contending sides. The defeat persuaded France to form a military alliance with the United States. After that rout, Cornwallis found it nearly impossible to persuade Loyalists to join the cause. Thereafter, men throughout America took up arms. Britain possessed a professional army and the worlds greatest navy. 33 A good description is in Bernhard Knollenberg, Growth of the American Revolution (N.Y.


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